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CLAIMING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN NEW
MEXICO UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

Employees in New Mexico are protected from various forms of employment discrimination under both federal and state law. Under various
provisions of federal and state statutes, it is unlawful for an employer
to discriminate against an employee on the basis of race, age, sex, physical
or mental disability, religion, national origin, color, or ancestry. Potential
remedies for employer violations of these laws include reinstatement,
backpay, actual damages, liquidated damages, punitive damages, and
attorneys' fees. Not all employers, however, are absolutely prohibited
from discriminating against their employees. In addition to a number of
defenses available to an employer, each of the federal and state employment discrimination laws requires a minimum number of employees
before an employer is subject to the provisions of the respective laws.
The primary object of this comment is to provide the practitioner with
a broad overview of the employment discrimination laws available in
New Mexico. Both the substantive provisions and procedural requirements
of the laws are discussed to highlight the variations. On the state level,
this comment discusses the New Mexico Human Rights Act.' On the
federal level, this comment discusses Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,2 the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 3 the Age Discrimination in Employment
5
Act of 1967, 4 and the new Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
Because the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New Mexico Human
Rights Act provide the broadest coverage, they are discussed more extensively than the other employment discrimination laws available to
aggrieved New Mexico employees.
TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 19646
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains the employment
provisions of a sweeping piece of federal legislation aimed at eliminating
discrimination in the workplace. In addition to the employment provisions
of Title VI, the Act also makes it unlawful to discriminate with respect
to housing and public accommodations. The passage of Title VI was in
essence the genesis of other federal and state legislation enacted with the
purpose of eliminating discrimination in the workplace. Indeed, our own
New Mexico Human Rights Act tracks many of the provisions of Title
VI.
II.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See infra notes 33-88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 6-32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 103-114 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 115-123 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
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A.

Substantive Provisions
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI" or "Act") makes
it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.7 An employer must be in an industry
affecting commerce and employ a minimum of fifteen employees to be
subject to the provisions of the Act.8 If a complainant establishes a prima
facie case of employment discrimination under Title VI, a number of
defenses are available to the employer. However, if the employer fails
to successfully defend against an employment discrimination claim, the
potential remedies available to the complainant employee include reinstatement or hire, 9 backpay, 0 and attorneys' fees."
B. Procedural Requirements
An aggrieved employee must file a written complaint with the federal
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").12 The complaint
must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory act was committed. 3 Upon the filing of the complaint, the EEOC
serves notice on the employer and commences its investigation into the
alleged discriminatory act. 14 If the EEOC determines that a valid claim
exists, it will try to resolve the matter through informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion.' 5
If conciliation fails, the EEOC may bring a civil action against the
employer.' 6 The EEOC must also notify the claimant if it dismisses the
charge or if it fails to reach a conciliation agreement with the affected
parties. After giving notice, the claimant has ninety days within which
7
to bring a civil action in federal court.'

7. Id. § 2000e-2(a).

8. Id. § 2000e(b).

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., 758 F.2d 1435 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988); see also Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988).
Id. § 2000e-5(b).
Id. § 2000e-5(e). In New Mexico, the 180 day statute of limitations is not necessarily an

absolute bar to a timely filing with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The State of
New Mexico is a deferral state. In deferral states, a further provision in section 2000e-5(e) suggests
that an aggrieved employee may file a timely charge with the EEOC up to 300 days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. In New Mexico, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the New Mexico Human Rights Commission have a work share agreement. Under
this agreement, the respective commissions agree to refer claims to each other. This referral process
ensures that a claim is deemed filed at both the federal and state commission, if filed timely with
either commission.
14. Id. § 2000e-5(b). The New Mexico work share agreement also specifies that the respective
commissions will be responsible for investigating a case if it comes before them. Upon completion
of the investigation, the respective commission forwards its findings to the other, thus avoiding
duplication of investigative efforts.
15. Id.
16. Id. § 2000e-5(f).
17. Id.
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Common Law
An analysis of the definition section of the Act demonstrates that
Congress failed to statutorily define the crucial concept of "discrimination." As a result, the courts have stepped in to provide a common
law definition. Since the adoption of the Act, the courts have recognized
and applied two primary theories of discrimination: disparate treatment
and adverse impact.
C.

1. Disparate Treatment
The common law doctrine of disparate treatment is premised upon a
showing of overtly different treatment of an employee by an employer
solely because of the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Thus, the intent of the employer is often a critical issue in these
cases. In the landmark case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,",
the United States Supreme Court set forth the standards governing the
consideration of disparate treatment claims.
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court stated that a disparate treatment
prima facie case is established by showing: (1) the plaintiff belongs to
a protected class; (2) the plaintiff applied and was qualified for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) despite his qualifications, the plaintiff was rejected; and (4) after plantiff's rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons with complainant's qualifications. 9
If an employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof
shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection.20 Once the employer articulates a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the employee, the employee is afforded an opportunity to show that the articulated reason
for his rejection is in fact pretextual. 2' Thus, under the Court's analysis
in McDonnell Douglas, the employee must demonstrate two elements to
prevail. The employee must prove the prima facie elements discussed
above and also prove that the employer's articulated reason for not hiring
him was a mere pretext.
For the defendant employer to prevail in a disparate treatment case,
he must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual reason
for an employee's rejection. A valid reason for an employee's rejection
may include the bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") defense,
which is available to the employer with respect to certain prohibited
activity.? Absent the BFOQ defense, the employer carries the burden of
18. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
19. Id. at 802.
20. Id.
21. Id.at 804.
22. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(e) (1988). This section states in part that "it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ... where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of [the] particular business or enterprise .... " See, e.g., Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, 510
F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (court upheld the exclusion of male nurses from a hospital's
obstetrics and gynecology department).
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proving a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the employee.
The defendant employer must be aware, however, that providing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason does not necessarily ensure that the
employer will prevail, as the employee maintains the opportunity to prove
that the articulated reason is pretextual, and thus may ultimately defeat
the employer's defense.
2.

Adverse Impact
The common law doctrine of adverse or disproportionate impact is a
somewhat less intuitive concept of discrimination. Rather than showing
overtly differential treatment, as in disparate treatment analysis, adverse
impact analysis seeks to unearth underlying discriminatory policies and
procedures which may be neutral on their face. Because it is the impact
of facially neutral policies and procedures which becomes the critical
issue, intent has traditionally been less of a factor in these types of cases.
A long line of federal court decisions have failed to provide an adequate
23
objective standard for determining what constitutes adverse impact.
u
However, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the United States Supreme
Court articulated the subjective elements of a plaintiff's prima facie
adverse impact case. The plaintiff must show that
tests ... select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern
significantly different from that of the pool of applicants. If an
employer does then meet the burden of proving that his tests are 'job
related,' it remains open to the complaining party to show that other
tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect,
would also serve the employer's
legitimate interest in 'efficient and
25
trustworthy workmanship.'

The first element of the plaintiff's case thus is to show that the policy,
procedure, test, or selection device adversely impacts upon the protected
class. The use of statistics is often critical at this stage.2 6 If the plaintiff
demonstrates adverse impact, the burden shifts to the employer defendant
to validate his selection process. Validation is the process by which the
defendant employer satisfies his burden of proof that his selection devices
are sufficiently "job related." If the employer successfully validates his
test, the burden swings back to the employee to prove the existence of
a better selection device.
The common law doctrine of adverse impact discrimination may very
well be a dead letter after the United States Supreme Court's decision

23. Some federal courts have adopted a "four-fifths rule." Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 690 F.2d 79 (2nd Cir. 1980). Under the four-fifths rule, an adverse impact prima facie
case may be established by showing a selection rate for members of a protected class of less than
800o of the rate of the non-protected class. Id.
24. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
25. Id. at 425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
26. See Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under

Title VII, 91 HAv. L. REv. 793 (1978).
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in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio. 27 The Court's decision was
a radical clarification of the existing common law burdens of proof in
favor of the defendant employer.
Under Wards Cove, a general showing of racial imbalance in the
employer's workforce is insufficient to sustain the plaintiff's prima facie
case. As a general rule, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the
application of a specific or particular employment practice that has created
the disparate impact under attack. 28 If the plaintiff successfully establishes
the primafacie case of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the employer
defendant to offer any business justification for the use of his selection
device or employment practice.29 Although the employer carries the burden
of producing evidence of a business justification for his employment
practice, the burden of persuasion never leaves the employee plaintiff.30
In addition to disparate treatment and adverse impact, a third cause
of action may be available to an aggrieved employee on the basis of an
employer's retaliation against an employee for invoking the protection
of Title VI. In this type of action, an employer cannot discriminate
against an employee simply because the employee opposed the employer's
unlawful discriminatory practices, filed a charge, testified, assisted, or
3
participated in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VI. '
Claims of disparate treatment are by far the majority of the cases
investigated by the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
in New Mexico. Thus, the common law substantive requirements of
McDonnell Douglas provide the basic legal framework most likely to
apply to an aggrieved New Mexico claimant under Title VI. Although
McDonnell Douglas sets forth the general rule, subsequent cases clarify
important nuances indicated by the McDonnell Douglas rule.3 2 Thus,
practitioners must view McDonnell Douglas as only the starting point
for further research.
The adverse impact doctrine is now disfavored in the federal courts.
In addition to the Supreme Court's Wards Cove decision, there are a
number of factors reducing the appeal of the adverse impact doctrine
to most prospective claimants. Even before Wards Cove, the prima facie
statistical requirements of the adverse impact doctrine were a costly and
time consuming endeavor for most prospective claimants. And, discriminatory employment policies and procedures over the last twenty-seven
years have arguably declined as a direct result of prospective disparate
treatment employer liability.
27. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
28. Id. at 657.
29. Id. at 658.
30. Id. at 659.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988); see, e.g., Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores,
654 F.2d 1130 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
32. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711 (1983); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Board of Trustees
of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Green, 438 U.S.
567 (1978).
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THE NEW MEXICO HUMAN RIGHTS ACT33

A.

Substantive Provisions
The New Mexico Human Rights Act ("Human Rights Act" or "Act")
makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to discriminate on the basis of race, age, religion, color, national origin,
ancestry, sex, physical or mental handicap, or medical condition. 34 An
employer must employ a minimum of four employees to be subject to
the provisions of the Act. 35 Potential remedies available to an aggrieved
employee include actual damages and attorneys' fees. 36 However, the bona
fide occupational qualification defense is available to the employer with
respect to all prohibited activity. 37
B.

Procedural Requirements
An aggrieved employee must file a written complaint with the New
Mexico Human Rights Commission. 38 The complaint must be filed with
the Commission within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory act was
committed. 39 The Commission must then promptly investigate the alleged
discriminatory act. 40 If the Commission determines that probable cause
exists, it must try to resolve the matter through persuasion and conciliation. 4' If the Commission determines that probable cause does not exist,
it must notify the complainant and respondent of the dismissal of the
complaint. 42 If conciliation fails, the Commission must issue a written
complaint in its own name against the employer. 43 The employer is then
required to appear at a hearing before the New Mexico Commission to
answer the allegations set forth in the complaint." The district court may
grant injunctive relief to ensure that orders of the New Mexico Commission
45
are effective.
C. Common Law
Over the past decade, a number of cases have sought to define and
clarify the substantive provisions and procedural requirements of the New
Mexico Human Rights Act. In Human Rights Commission of New Mexico
v. Board of Regents of University of New Mexico College of Nursing,4

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to -15 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
Id. § 28-1-7(A).
Id. § 28-1-2(B).
Id. § 28-1-13(D).
Id. § 28-1-7(A).
Id. § 28-1-10(A).
Id.
Id. § 28-1-10(B).
Id. § 28-1-10(C).
Id. § 28-1-10(B).
Id. § 28-1-10(D).
Id.
Id. § 28-1-10(E).
95 N.M. 576, 624 P.2d 518 (1981) [hereinafter College of Nursing].
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the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the
University of New Mexico, in administering its academic program, is "a
public accommodation" within the definition of New Mexico Human
47
Rights Act section 28-1-2(G). In this case, a black nursing student
claimed that the university discriminated against her on the basis of race
in evaluation procedures. The claimant further alleged that the university
was a public accommodation, an entity covered by the Act.
The Act explicitly makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for any
person in any public accommodation to make a distinction based on
is not a "public
race.4 The court held that the University of New Mexico
49
accommodation" within the meaning of the Act. The court reasoned
that the prohibition against discrimination in public accommodations arose
from the common law duties of innkeepers and public carriers0 to provide
their services to the public without unreasonable conditions. In closing,
narrowly and
the court warned that their holding should be construed
5'
was applicable only under the circumstances at bar.
In Bottijliso v. Hutchinson Fruit Co.,S2 the New Mexico Court of
Appeals generally discussed the Human Rights Act in the context of a
3
wrongful discharge case. The issue before the court was whether a cause
5
of action exists in tort against a prior employer for discharge because
Compensation Act. '
of the exercise of one's rights under the Workman's
The plaintiff claimed wrongful discharge grounded in tort on the basis
that he was terminated immediately upon filing a claim under the Workman's Compensation Act."
The court rejected the plaintiff's claim, but in so doing emphasized
56
a particular section of the New Mexico Human Rights Act. Under
section 28-1-7(I)(2), it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any
person or employer to engage in any form of threats, reprisal or discrimination against any person who has opposed any unlawful discriminatory practice or who has filed a complaint, testified, or participated
in any proceeding under the Human Rights Act." In sum, New Mexico
employers are expressly prohibited from retaliating against employees who
oppose unlawful discrimination, file a complaint, testify, or participate

47. Id. at 577, 624 P.2d at 519.
48. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
49. College of Nursing, 95 N.M. at 577, 624 P.2d at 519.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 578, 624 P.2d at 520.
52. 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992 (Ct. App. 1981).
the
53. In addition to the statutory protection against discrimination discussed in this comment,
termination.
New Mexico courts have begun to recognize the common law doctrine of wrongful
tort and
The doctrine of wrongful termination is premised upon the common law doctrines of
the
under
coverage
for
qualify
not
do
who
employees
Mexico
New
Aggrieved
breach of contract.
a successful
various statutory provisions discussed in this comment may nevertheless be able to bring
-(1991).
action for wrongful termination. See Survey, Employment Law, 21 N.M.L. REV.
54. Bottijliso, 96 N.M. at 790, 635 P.2d at 993.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 793, 635 P.2d at 996.
57. Id.
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in proceedings under the Act. The plaintiff in this particular case arguably
would have prevailed if the Workman's Compensation Act had contained
a similar provision.
In Dominguez v. Stone," the court of appeals reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff's claims
of defamation of reputation59 and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.6 The court, however, also held that actions would not lie under
section 198361 or the New Mexico Human Rights Act. The court's discussion of the Act was primarily related to procedural matters. 62
In affirming the district court's summary judgment with respect to the
plaintiff's Human Rights Act claim, the court of appeals concluded that
it did not have subject matter jurisdiction.63 The court reasoned that if
an appeal is to be taken from the district court's decision with respect
to a Human Rights Act action, that appeal must be made directly to
the New Mexico Supreme Court." The court left open the question of
whether compliance with the administrative procedures of the Act is a
prerequisite to immediate judicial review. 65
In Jaramillo v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc.,66 the court of appeals seemingly
reversed itself by addressing the specific issue of administrative compliance
under the Human Rights Act. The court held that compliance with the
grievance procedure proscribed by the Act is indeed a prerequisite to suit
under the provisions of the Act.
In Vigil v. Arzola,67 the New Mexico Court of Appeals again discussed
the Act in the context of a wrongful discharge case." The Vigil decision
held that tort actions for wrongful termination may be sustained by
proving employee termination in contravention of a generally accepted
public policy. 69 The court identified a violation of the Act as contrary
to New Mexico public policy and thus arguably an accepted public policy
for wrongful termination analysis. 70
Two recent New Mexico Supreme Court decisions have especially sought
to clarify the substantive provisions of the Act. In Smith v. FDC Corp.,71
a fifty-nine-year-old Native American worker brought suit against his
former employer alleging age and race discrimination in his termination.
The primary issue before the supreme court was whether the district
court's findings of discrimination and damages were supported by sub-

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

97 N.M. 211, 638 P.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 214, 638 P.2d at 426.
Id. at 215, 638 P.2d at 427.
Id. at 216, 638 P.2d at 428.
See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
Dominguez, 97 N.M. at 216, 638 P.2d at 428.
Id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-13(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
Dominguez, 97 N.M. at 216, 638 P.2d at 428.
102 N.M. 272, 694 P.2d 528 (Ct. App. 1985).
102 N.M. 682, 699 P.2d 613 (Ct. App. 1983).
See supra note 53.
Vigil, 102 N.M. at 688, 699 P.2d at 619.
Id. at 688-89, 699 P.2d at 619-20.
109 N.M. 514, 787 P.2d 433 (1990).
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stantial evidence. The court held that the district court's findings were
supported with respect to both discrimination and damages.
By applying federal common law, the supreme court concluded that
Smith had indeed been discriminated against. However, the court warned
that any reliance on the methodology adopted in the federal courts "should
not be interpreted as an indication that [New Mexico has] adopted federal
law as [its] own." 72 Proceeding, the court stated: "[Olur analysis of this
claim is based on [the] New Mexico statute and our legislature's intent,
and, by this opinion, we are not binding New Mexico law to interpretations
73
made by the federal courts of the federal statute [Title VI]."
74
methodology,
Douglas
Although the court discussed the McDonnell
its decision in fact turned on other federal court cases standing for the
by a
proposition that the McDonnell Douglas analysis may be bypassed
7 5 The court
evidence.
direct
through
discrimination
showing of intentional
76
of this case
held the new Wards Cove analysis inapplicable to the factsMexico
law. 77
New
to
applicability
its
to
as
opinion
further
and withheld
The plaintiff, however, did sustain his claim under the Act by demonsubstantial direct evidence of discrimination based on age and
strating
78
race.

Because of the plaintiff's "situation," the supreme court concluded
court to estimate future
that "it was not inappropriate for the [district]
' 79 Elsewhere in the decision,
lost earnings based upon . . . past income."
°
the court upheld other aspects of the district court's award of damages
and attorneys' fees. 8 '
The New Mexico Supreme Court discussed three important issues relating to the Act in Behrmann v. Phototron:8283 (1) whether the district
court erred in giving both a McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse"
instruction, thereby misleading the jury; (2) whether the district court
erred in refusing to admit evidence of the Human Rights Commission's
in instructing the jury
determination; and (3) whether the court erred
5
that it could consider prospective damages.

72. Id. at 517, 787 P.2d at 436.
73. Id.

74. Id. at 517-18, 787 P.2d at 436-37.
75. Id. at 518, 787 P.2d at 437.
76. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
77. Smith, 109 N.M. at 518, 787 P.2d at 437.
78. Id. at 519-20, 787 P.2d at 438-39.
79. Id. at 521, 787 P.2d at 440.
80. Id. at 520-21, 787 P.2d at 439-40.
81. Id. at 521-22, 787 P.2d at 440-41.
82. 110 N.M. 323, 795 P.2d 1015 (1990).
83. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
84. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court
expressed the view that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a motivating
part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not
taken the plaintiff's gender into account. Id. at 244-45.
85. Behrmann, 110 N.M. at 324-25, 795 P.2d at 1016-17.
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The supreme court affirmed the action of the district court on all

issues. The court concluded that this was not a case where the two
instructions (i.e., McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse) were repetitious or contradictory or unduly emphasized evidence introduced by
a party.8 6 Furthermore, the court concluded that the Commission's determination was properly excluded evidence on the grounds that section

28-1-13(B) 7 of the Act did not apply as there was no "record" of a
Commission hearing. The Commission's conclusion of no probable cause

resulted only from an investigation. Finally, the court concluded that
prospective damages were in fact included within the scope of the Act's

provision for actual damages under section 28-1-13.88
IV.

THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 196389

A.

Substantive Provisions
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 was enacted as an amendment to the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938. 90 The Equal Pay Act makes it unlawful

for an employer to discriminate on the basis of sex. 91 An employer is

subject to the Equal Pay Act if he engages in interstate commerce,92

employs at least two employees, 93 and earns a gross income in excess of
$500,000.94 Potential remedies available to an aggrieved employee include
frontpay, 91 backpay, 96 liquidated damages if wilful violation of the Equal
97

Pay Act can be shown, and attorneys' fees." The BFOQ defense is not
available to the employer with respect to prohibited activity.
B.

Procedural Requirements
An aggrieved employee may proceed directly to either federal or state
99

court.

A jury trial is available. Although administrative proceedings are

86. Id. at 327, 795 P.2d at 1019.
87. The court stated that the New Mexico Human Rights Commission has the duty to file with
the district court "so much of the transcript of the record as the parties requesting the transcript
designate as necessary .... ." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-13(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
88. Behrmann, 110 N.M. at 328, 795 P.2d at 1020.

89. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
90. 29 U.S.C §§ 201-19 (1988).
91. Section 206(d)(1) reads in part that "[n]o employer having employees subject to any provisions
of this section shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to
employees ...

at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to the opposite sex

equal work.. .. "

92.' Section 206(b) reads: "Every employer shall pay to each of his employees ...

...

who ...

for

employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce ... not less than the minimum wage rate." Commerceis
is defined as "trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several
states ....
29 U.S.C. § 203(b).
. 93. The term "enterprise engaged in commerce" is further defined as "an enterprise [that] has
employees engaged in commerce .... " 29 U.S.C. § 203(b). Because Congress used the term "employees" rather than "an employee," the Act has been construed to require two employees.
94. Id. § 203(3)(1)(A)(ii).
95. Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
96. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 740 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
97. Id.

98. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
99. Osoky v. Wick, 704 F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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available by filing a complaint with the EEOC, the employee should
beware of the possibility of losing his individual right to go to court if
employee.1°
the EEOC exercises its authority and files suit on behalf of the
0
Although a two year statute of limitations normally applies,' it is possible
limitations to three years in the case of a wilful
to extend the statute of
2
violation of the Act.1
V.

THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF
1967103

Substantive Provisions04
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") makes
it an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to discriminate
on the basis of age."° An employer must be in an industry affecting
commerce and employ a minimum of twenty employees to be subject to
the ADEAY06 Potential remedies available to an aggrieved employee
8
include backpay,'07 frontpay,'0 liquidated damages if a0 wilful violation
1°9 and attorneys' fees."
The bona fide
of the ADEA can be shown,
occupational qualification defense is available to the employer if he can
show a valid safety concern."'

A.

Procedural Requirements
Since 1978, ADEA claimants have been required to conform to many
2
of the procedural requirements applicable to Title VI claimants." An
ADEA claimant must comply with administrative procedures before the
EEOC prior to taking his claim to state or federal court."' The plaintiff
must make a timely demand in order to exercise his right to a jury
trial. 114

B.

100. EEOC v. Home of Economy, Inc., 712 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1983).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1988)..
102. EEOC v. Central Kansas Medical Center, 705 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1983).
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112. See Reorganization Plan No.1 of 1978, § 2, 3 C.F.R. § 321 (1978).
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114. Scharnhorst v. Independent School Dist., 686 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
U.S. 1109 (1983).
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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990"1

A.

Substantive Provisions
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") makes it an
unlawful discriminatory practice for a "covered entity" to discriminate
against a "qualified individual with a disability. ' " 6 The ADA defines a
"covered entity" as an employer, employment agency, labor organization,
or joint labor-management committee." 7 The ADA defines a "qualified
individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires to occupy."" 's "Disability" is further defined
as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
life activities .

."119
"..

An employer must be engaged in an industry affecting commerce and
employ a minimum of fifteen employees to be subject to the provisions
of the ADA.z 20 Potential remedies available to an aggrieved employee
include those available under Title VI.121 The bona fide occupational
qualification defense is not available to the employer with respect to the
prohibited activity.
B.

ProceduralRequirements
The employment provisions of the ADA will not take effect until July
26, 1992.' 22 When the ADA does take effect, it will be administered by
23
the EEOC.
VII.

SUPPLEMENTARY FEDERAL ACTIONS

A.

Substantive Provisions
There are a number of federal alternatives which may be available to
an aggrieved New Mexico employee. These actions may be brought
pursuant to the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts. The Reconstruction
Civil Rights Acts include the Civil Rights Act of 1866,' 24 section one of
the the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ' 25 and section two of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871.126 These Acts were enacted by the United States Congress

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to -213 (1990).
Id. § 12102(a).
Id. § 12101(2).
Id. § 12101(8).
Id. § 12102(2).
Id. § 12101(5)(A).
Id. § 12107(a); see supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
Id. § 12108.
Id. § 12107; see supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
Id. § 1983.
Id. § 1985(c).
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shortly after the Civil War to ensure enforcement of the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments.
Section 1981 and section 1983 actions may be of particular interest to
an aggrieved employee because of the potential remedies available to a
successful plaintiff. Should the employee prevail on one of these claims,
a jury 27 may 2award both compensatory and punitive damages against
the employer.
Section 1981 claims are typically brought in conjunction with the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, and an aggrieved employee may
bring a claim against a public or private employer who fails to enter
into or enforce the terms of an employment contract based on race or
national origin. 29 Section 1983 claims are typically brought in conjunction
with the fourteenth amendment, and an aggrieved employee, not qualifying
for protection under Title VI, may bring an action against an employer
to the violation of any
acting under color of state law with respect
30 sex, 3' religion, 32 or national
right on the basis of race,
employment
33
origin.
Procedural Requirements
Section 1981 and section 1983 claims may be brought
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statute
constitutional amendment. There is a three year
34
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CONCLUSION
An aggrieved employee in New Mexico has a number of state and
federal law alternatives available to remedy employment discrimination.
However, each of the available laws confers specific rights to certain
protected classes of individuals. An employee must be a member of a
protected class to qualify for the rights provided by a particular law.
Qualification for protection under a particular law does not absolutely
ensure that the right or remedy will necessarily follow. Each of the laws
VIII.
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(1987).
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contains substantive requirements for establishing a prima facie case.
Even if an employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer may
have a number of defenses which will defeat the employee's claim.
There are a number of procedural requirements in addition to the
substantive provisions of the respective laws. Among these procedural
requirements are express statutes of limitation which set forth specific
time requirements in which to bring an action. An action filed beyond
these time requirements risks immediate dismissal without ever reaching
the merits of the employee's case. Although the area of employment
discrimination law is a complex, dynamic, and rapidly changing field, 35
this comment has attempted to provide the practitioner with a broad
overview of the substantive and procedural employment discrimination
law issues currently confronting aggrieved New Mexico employees.
DAVID L. CEBALLES

135. Over the last two years the United States Congress has debated a new Civil Rights
Act
which would substantially impact the law of employment discrimination. This year's House
Bill I
and Senate Bill 611 would make substantial amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of
1964 so as to strengthen protections against discrimination in employment. See H.R. 1, 102nd
Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991); S. 611, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1991). In 1990, a presidential veto was narrowly
sustained regarding similar legislation.

